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defined and discussed. In the remainder of the book Mezey attempts a "more detailed assessment of the way in which the five
legislative types are involved in policy making." (47) His
thoughtful and challenging comparative analysis of the five types is
organized around two major concepts: policy-making phases and
policy-making arenas. Policy-making phases include formulation,
deliberation, and oversight. A policy-making arena is a physical
setting within which policy-makers interact-i.e., plenary session,
party caucus, legislative committee, cabinet, etc. In addition to the
policy-making function, the legislative types are examined in terms
of two other "expectations" or functions: representation and system
maintenance. Concluding his comprehensive survey and analysis of
the literature on legislatures, Mezey argues that legislatures will
tend to serve the representation function in the future, in contrast to
the policy-making and system maintenance "expectations."
These books are well worth reading. Each presents a wealth of
detail, interesting theoretical insights, and challenging propositions
about legislative behavior. Minor shortcomings could be mentioned, but these would be in terms of evaluations and judgment
rather than of fact.
JOEL G. VERNER, Illinois State University

The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. By TERRY M. MOE. (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. x, 282. $21.00.)
The Organization of Interests is a welcome addition to the body of
literature devoted to political interest groups. Moe addresses two
central questions. Why do people join organizations? Once they
have become members of an organization, what sustains their
membership? Earlier, group theorists might have sought an explanation for these decisions in the putative values of the membership of the organization. (I say "might have" because it is not clear
that the decision to join was then a serious issue.) Individuals are
members because their interests are identical to those articulated by
the organization. Thus, common interests gave rise to collective
(group) action.
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Mancur Olson's subsequent work, The Logic of Collective Action,
introduced the concepts of collective good and selective incentives to
show that the bonding material of organizational behavior was not
shared values, but rather selective incentives as they serve to satisfy
the personal goals of members of the organization. Rational selfinterest contributes to a concern for material well-being, and
political incentives (whether collective goods or purposive incentives, such as an ideology), are subordinate considerations in the individual's calculus of costs and benefits associated with such decisions.
The purpose of Moe's book is to suggest a middle ground between
the two positions. The author seeks to determine whether or not the
political objectives of an interest group are more salient than Olson's
model suggests. To this end he examines both case studies of interest groups abroad and in the United States and questionnaire data
from five interest groups in Minnesota.
The Organization of Interests is worth reading. It is unique in its
effort to examine Olson's model of organizational incentives and
contains some provocative ideas about the role of organizational
leadership. Moe's discussion of the Entrepreneur (the leader) has a
quality that reminds one of Nicolo's advice to his Prince. The Entrepreneur is, according to Moe, principally devoted to the maximization of a surplus in the exchange of costs and benefits so that
the organization can survive. Organizational survival is necessary
for the career of the Entrepreneur. But the surplus is not necessarily the same as profits or the attainment of other collective goods. It
means that the Entrepreneur will maximize his surplus -even at the
expense of organizational goals -through the selection of an incentive structure that combines both collective goods and selective incentives. The potential of material self-interest and personal aggrandizement is clear, and an examination of this possibility would
seem to have been in order. One miglht ask, if the Entrepreneur is
also susceptible to the siren temptation of self-interest, then where
are those persons who will hold high the standards of principle and
cause on behalf of the group?
The first half of this book, the chapters dealing with the logic of
individual decisions and intra-organizational politics, provides
stimulating reading. I regret that the latter half is less rewarding. I
expected that more would be said of the role of the Entrepreneur,
whom the author admits to be the pivotal figure for understanding
organizational incentives, but no effort is made to develop this role
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beyond chapter 4. Chapter 6 treats pluralism as the traditional
background for such efforts. But it seems to be a weak transition
between the micro analysis of the first half of the volume and the
statement of mixed motivations and the broader treatment afforded
interest groups of the second. The studies of interest groups cited in
chapter 7 consistently reveal support for the greater importance of
economic self-interest as an incentive, evident even among the classconscious British workers. And the data collected by the author,
from five interest groups in Minnesota, would seem to add a final
fillip to the pervasiveness of self-interest as an imperative of the
organization, rather than evidence of a concern for collective goods.
Moe mnayvery well be correct in his belief that there is a mid-field
position between the group theorists and Olson. His data, however,
hardly allow him to make a compelling case for his charting of this
ground.
RONALD J. BUSCH,

Cleveland State University

Privacy, Law, and Public Policy. By DAVID M. O'BRIEN. (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979. Pp. xiv, 262. $24.95.)
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court
fashioned a constitutional right-of-privacy, a term not mentioned in
the Constitution and unknown to its framers. The right was alleged
to be implied, via "emanations" and "penumbras," in a host of constitutional guarantees. In more recent cases this pretense has been
dropped, and in a revival of substantive due process, the concept of
privacy has been nebulously sheltered in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as an aspect of the individual's "liberty" which
government may not invade.
To the extent that privacy received recognition as a constitutional
value prior to Griswold, it was limited to certain specifically defined
constitutional contexts and was not treated as a right per se, handily
available for general judicial deployment. The Fourth Amendment, for example, grants a "right to be let alone," in Justice
Brandeis's felicitous phrase, but only from unreasonable search and
seizure. Even there, protection of privacy was not necessarily the
only, or even principal, motivation of the framers. Justice
Frankfurter-who, except where considerations of federalism intervened, generally construed search and seizure restrictions more

